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THE BOARD OF PRISON TERMS AND
PAROLES AND INDETERMINATE
SENTENCING: A CRITIQUE
Jack Meyerson*
Washington newspapers regularly report superior court prison sen-
tencings. A reader may learn that a rapist received a life sentence or a
burglar a 15-year sentence. While some may feel these sentences are
too harsh, and others may believe they are justifiable, few realize that
the sentence which appears in the newspaper bears little relationship
to the length of time an offender will spend in prison; the amount of
time actually served is determined by the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles. 1
The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is given the authority to
release most felons from prison when it has determined that the pris-
oner has been rehabilitated, 2 regardless of the length of time the pris-
oner has served. Rehabilitation usually consists of satisfactory partici-
pation in a formal prison program designed to change the person's
criminal behavior into behavior which is more acceptable. The Board
has, however, become a target of manipulation by prisoners who indi-
cate outward compliance with rehabilitation procedures in order to be
deemed "rehabilitated" and therefore released from prison prior to the
expiration of their maximum sentences. In order to alleviate this and
other problems with the present system, it is suggested that much of
the Board's discretion to release prisoners prior to the completion of
their maximum terms be removed.
I. THE BOARD OF PRISON TERMS AND PAROLES
A. Board Powers
In Washington, when an offender is convicted and sent to prison,
* Assistant U.S. Attorney, W. Wash.; Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, King County,
1973-75; Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; B.A., 1969, Princeton University;
J.D., 1972, Harvard University.
1. For personal observations on how parole and sentence length decisions are
made, see Johnson, The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles: Criteria in Decision
Making, 51 WASH. L. REV. 643 (1976).
2. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text infra.
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the sentencing judge sets only a maximum term of confinement. 3 This
maximum term is set in accordance with the applicable criminal
statute. Although all felonies carry substantial prison terms and many
serious crimes are punishable by as much as twenty years to life, 4
most felons actually serve much shorter terms because the Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles has broad discretion over the minimum
amount of time a prisoner must serve. Therefore, of those criminals
sentenced to prison, the median term of imprisonment is 16.3
months.5 Most prisoners are paroled prior to the completion of their
minimum terms. 6
Within six months after a convicted felon is admitted to an institu-
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.010 (1974) provides in part:
When a person is convicted of any felony ... the court shall sentence such per-
son to the penitentiary, or, if the law allows and the court sees fit to exercise such
discretion, to the reformatory, and shall fix the maximum term of such person's
sentence only.
The maximum term to be fixed by the court shall be the maximum provided by
law for the crime of which such person was convicted, if the law provides for a
maximum term.
The statute states that where the law fails to provide a maximum term, the sentencing
judge must impose a maximum of at least twenty years and may set the maximum at
life imprisonment. Id.
4. For example, murder and first degree arson are class A felonies, punishable by
imprisonment of from 20 years to life. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.030(2), -. 050(2),
9A.48.020(2). 9A.20.020(l)(a) (Supp. 1975). Id. tit. 9A is effective July I. 1976. Id.
§ 9A.20.010 establishes five classes of crimes for purposes of punishment: class A.
class B. and class C felonies; gross misdemeanors; and misdemeanors. The maximum
authorized sentences are set by id. § 9A.20.020:
Prison Fine
Felony Class A 20 years to life not more than $10,000
Felony Class B not more than 10 years not more than $10,000
Felony Class C not more than 5 years not more than $ 5,000
Gross Misdemeanor (jail) not more than 1 year not more than $ 1,000
Misdemeanor (jail) not more than 90 days not more than $ 500
Id. § 9A.20.030 permits restitution to victims in lieu of fines and id. § 9A.20.040 at-
tempts to relate crimes outside of Title 9A to the sentencing structure above.
If one is convicted of aggravated murder, however, the mandatory punishment is
death. If the death sentence is commuted or held to be unconstitutional, the prisoner
receives a mandatory life sentence. That life sentence cannot be "suspended, deferred,
or commuted by any judicial officer, and the board of prison terms and paroles shall
never parole a prisoner or reduce the period of confinement nor release the convicted
person as a result of any automatic good time calculation nor shall . . . the convicted
person ... participate in any work release or furlough program." Id. § 9A.32.047. But
see Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W. 5230 (U.S. July 2, 1976).
5. Office of Research. Washington State Dep't of Social & Health Serv.. Table 5
[Median Length of Stay in Months by Race, by Offense Category and by Fiscal Year
of Release (Regular Parole)]. June, 1973 (unpublished statistics on file at the offices of
the Washington Law Review).
6. Compare Table 3 with Table 10 in Comment, A Perspective on Adult Correc-
tions in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 495 (1976).
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tion, the Board fixes the duration of his confinement. 7 This duration
of confinement is a minimum term. 8 Once the initial minimum term
has been established, the Board may, at any subsequent time, redeter-
mine it.9 If a prisoner behaves well and has a good record within the
institution, the Board may allow good time credits toward the reduc-
tion of the term of imprisonment. 10 Similarly, if a prisoner violates
rules and regulations of the institution and is generally uncooperative,
the Board may revoke and redetermine the offender's minimum
term." A prisoner may not be released from a penitentiary or refor-
matory before the expiration of his maximum term unless, in the
opinion of the Board, his rehabilitation has been complete and he is a
fit subject for release.' 2
The discretion of the Board also extends to convictions for criminal
acts for which the legislature has mandated a five-year minimum sen-
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.040 (1974). The Board's term must not exceed the
maximum provided by law or set by the sentencing judge.
8. State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn. 2d 686, 171 P.2d 845 (1946); Pierce v. Smith, 31
Wn. 2d 52, 195 P.2d 112 (1948). In Fairbanks the supreme court held that the Board
has the authority to set a minimum term for criminal conduct that was explicitly out-
lawed subsequent to the enactment of the indeterminate sentencing system. The court
in Pierce stated specifically that the Board's determination constitutes a minimum term.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.052 (1974) states:
At any time after the board of prison terms and paroles has determined the
minimum term of confinement of any person subject to confinement in a state
correctional institution, the board may request the superintendent of such correc-
tional institution to conduct a full review of such person's prospects for rehabili-
tation and report to the board the facts of such review and the resulting findings.
Upon the basis of such report and such other information and investigation that
the board deems appropriate the board may redetermine and refix such convicted
person's minimum term of confinement.
10. Id. § 9.95.070 states:
Every prisoner who has a favorable record of conduct at the penitentiary or the
reformatory, and who performs in a faithful, diligent, industrious, orderly and
peaceable manner the work, duties, and tasks assigned to him to the satisfaction
of the superintendent of the penitentiary or reformatory, and in whose behalf the
superintendent ... files a report certifying that his conduct and work have been
meritorious and recommending allowance of time credits to him, shall upon, but
not until, the adoption of such recommendations by the board . " . be allowed
time credit reductions from the term of imprisonment fixed by the board . ...
The maximum good time credit which can be allowed is one-third the minimum term
set by the board. Id. § 9.95.110 (1974).
11. Id. § 9.95.080. The statute also provides that good time credits may be re-
moved only after a hearing before the Board. At the hearing the offender is entitled
to present evidence and witnesses on his behalf.
12. Lindsey v. Superior Court, 33 Wn. 2d 94, 204 P.2d 482 (1949). The court
stated:
The discharge or release from imprisonment of a convicted person serving a
maximum sentence is not, prior to the expiration of his maximum term, a matter
of right, but is a matter of discretion with the board of prison terms and paroles.
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tence for the first offense, for instance, commission of a felony while
armed with a deadly weapon.13 In these instances the Board may pa-
role an inmate prior to expiration of a mandatory minimum sentence
provided such inmate has behaved in a manner that satisfies the
Board.14 Four of the seven Board members 15 can set any minimum
they deem appropriate, even for those offenses where the legislature
imposed mandatory minimum terms of life and prohibited parole at
less than 20 years minus good time. Consequently, with limited excep-
tions, an offender's duration of incarceration is not established by the
sentencing judge, but by the members of the Board of Prison Terms
and Paroles.16
B. The Members and Procedures of the Board
The legislature has provided that the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles 17 consist of seven members appointed by the governor with
Such prisoner may not be released from the penitentiary or the reformatory un-
less, in the opinion of the board of prison terms and paroles, his rehabilitation has
been complete ....
Id. at 104-05, 204 P.2d at 487. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1974). See also But-
ler v. Cranor, 38 Wn. 2d 471, 230 P.2d 306 (1951), where the court held that a prisoner
was not entitled to release as a matter of right until the end of his maximum sentence.
Release of the offender was entirely within the discretion of the Board.
13. If by special verdict of the jury or by a finding of fact by the judge it is deter-
mined that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon during commission of the
crime, see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.015 (1974), id. § 9.95.040(1), (2) compels the
Board to set a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. § 9.95.040(2) defines the term
"deadly weapon." If, however, the trial judge or jury makes no special finding as re-
quired by id. § 9.95.015, the Board need not impose a mandatory minimum sentence.
See State v. Coma, 69 Wn. 2d 177, 417 P.2d 853 (1966). Id. § 9.41.025 requires the
addition of a penalty for use of a firearm in an "inherently dangerous crime" to the
penalty prescribed by law for commission of the crime without the firearm. See State
v. Smith, 11 Wn. App. 216, 521 P.2d 1197 (1974); State v. Canady, 69 Wn. 2d 886,
421 P.2d 347 (1966).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.040(4) (1974) provides that, with the exception of
cases of murder in the first or second degree, "the board may parole an inmate prior
to the expiration of a mandatory minimum term, provided such inmate has demon-
strated meritorious effort in rehabilitation and at least four board members concur in
such action .... "
15. In 1969 the size of the Board was increased from five to seven. Id. § 9.95.003.
At that time id. § 9.95.040 (requiring four Board members to concur in order to parole
an inmate prior to the expiration of a mandatory minimum term) was not amended to
reflect that change. In Baker v. Morris, 84 Wn. 2d 804, 529 P.2d 1091 (1974), the
court struck down an administrative rule requiring the concurrence of six of the seven
members before a mandatory minimum term could be waived.
16. The power of the Board is limited in instances of aggravated murder, first and
second degree murder, and first degree rape. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.047 (Supp.
1975), 9.95.040 (1974), 9.79.170 (Supp. 1975).
17. Id. § 9.95.001 (1974).
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the consent of the Senate.18 Board members hold office for five years
and are removable only for court-determined cause during their term
of office. 19 Members are required to meet with offenders at the state
penitentiary and other institutions to study the cases of convicted
persons whose terms of imprisonment are to be determined, and to
handle parole applications.20 The Board is authorized to transact
business in panels of two members, but a majority of the members
must decide policy matters and matters pertaining to the internal af-
fairs of the Board.2' The Board is not authorized to utilize hearing
officers, but pending legislation would authorize the use of hearing
officers and would limit Board functions to appellate adjudication and
rulemaking in the areas of minimum sentence determination, pardon,
and parole.22
One of the problems of the Board is the fact that it is not an elec-
tive body and its actions are not subject to review. Consequently,
Board decisions are not subject to effective public supervision. Addi-
tionally, the statutes governing Board operations do not specify any
qualifications for members, and, although the members of recent
Boards have displayed unusually appropriate qualifications for ser-
vice,23 such qualifications are not guaranteed where the appointment
of members might be subject to undue political influence or where
members could be appointed on the basis of past political service
rather than penological expertise.
II. WASHINGTON SENTENCING STRUCTURE: A
CRITIQUE
Washington has a modified indeterminate sentencing system. The
theory behind this system is that offenders are to remain in prison
until they are rehabilitated. Criminal conduct is thus viewed as a dis-
18. Id. § 9.95.003.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 9.95.005.
21. Id. § 9.95.007.
22. See S.H.B. 487, § 6, 44th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1975).
23. Of the seven present Board members, six have college degrees and five have
advanced degrees. Four members hold the degree of Master of Social Work. All seven
members have experience in the criminal justice system either in law enforcement,juvenile services, prisons and other state institutions, or parole and probation work.
A description of the members of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is on file at
the offices of the Washington Law Review.
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ease; something foreign and abnormal in the individual which pre-
sumably can be cured. 24 Criminals are to be isolated and undergo a
series of treatments. Once "rehabilitated," they may return to the
community. Therefore, although a judge may send an offender to
prison for a lengthy maximum term, the length of commitment will
actually depend upon the offender's response to treatment programs,
as evaluated by the Board.
The Washington statutes outlining imprisonment procedures are
phrased in terms indicative of the theory behind the sentencing
system: each offender serves his term until "his rehabilitation has been
complete and he is a fit subject for release." 25 Upon being committed
to prison, all prisoners go through an extensive initial evaluation. 26
Based on this evaluation inmates are then placed in available prison
treatment programs. Their progress is monitored and that progress
determines the length of time that they ultimately serve. An individual
may, through his efforts within prison, mitigate or modify his sen-
tence. The concept is that by testing an individual's responses within
the institution, penal authorities will be able to determine when he or
she can be a productive member of society and safely return to the
community.
A. Inequality: Different Punishments for Similar Crimes
The first difficulty with the Washington indeterminate sentencing
system is that, because of the discretionary power held by prison offi-
cials and members of the parole board, individuals who commit sim-
ilar crimes serve different sentences. For example, a burglar who satis-
factorily completes his high school education in prison, and who ac-
tively participates in group therapy sessions may be released earlier
than a person with the very same history of criminality who is un-
cooperative and who refuses to participate in group therapy.
Within recent years this system of indeterminate sentencing has
resulted in dramatically disparate sentences.27 The interjection of so-
24. See generally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1969); Morris &
Buckle, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment: A Reply to C.S. Lewis, 6 RES
JUDICATAE 231 (1953).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1974).
26. See generally id. ch. 72.13. The reception and classification center for adult
males is located at Shelton, Washington. See also Comment, A Perspective on Adult
Corrections in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REv. 495 (1976).
27. Two articles in a Seattle newspaper recently highlighted the plight of Bobbie
622
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ciological and rehabilitative strategies into determining an offender's
length of incarceration creates this inequality. It has been the author's
experience that those prisoners who "know how to do time" obtain
earlier release. Serious social policy questions as to the advisability of
permitting disparate treatment of offenders based on factors deter-
mined to be important by an administrative tribunal emerge from this
experience.28
Miller who, at age 16, was committed to a state institution for-joyriding. At the time
of his release he had spent 9 years in a reformatory and a prison. This excessive stay
resulted from what prison officials and the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles consid-
ered his rebellious and unrepentent manner within the institutions. Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Jan. 13, 1975, atA7, col. 2, and Mar. 18, 1975, at A9, col. 2.
In contrast, the author was involved in the case of an offender who had served four
previous prison terms. Most recently he had been sentenced for life, having raped a
woman while armed with a firearm. Such an offense carries a mandatory minimum of
five years and the sentencing judge committed him for life. He was released by the
Board after having served slightly over one year. I learned of his prior criminal history
after interviewing a young mother he had raped, kidnapped, and robbed.
28. Equal protection is guaranteed both by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 and
WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 12, but the courts have not found the disparities in length of
sentences inherent in indeterminate sentencing violative of those constitutional provi-
sions. In State v. Hurst, 5 Wn. App. 146, 486 P.2d 1136 (1971), the Washington Court
of Appeals, in a case involving a felon who was sentenced to a greater term than his
partner in the same crime, held that although disparity was generally to be avoided,
the disparity in sentencing was justifiable given the defendant's criminal background.
The court, citing State ex rel. O'Brien v. Towne, 64 Wn. 2d 581, 392 P.2d 818 (1964),
indicated that differences in degree'of prior criminal involvement were a rational
basis for classification. See also Davis v. Rhay, 156.F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Wash. 1957),
affd, 256 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1958); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wn. App. 386, 534 P.2d 1394
(1975).
The administrative determination of sentencing has also been upheld as consistent
with equal protection standards. In Stiltner v. Rhay, 258 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Wash.),
affd, 367 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 941 (1966), rehearing denied,
385 U.S. 1044 (1967), the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington stated,
with respect to the Washington statutory system:[I]t is unnecessary to cite authority.for the proposition that the enactment of
reasonable criminal statutes is within the police powers of a state. The statutes
here do not conflict with any constitutional limitation nor with any subject dele-
gated to the federal government. They are not unconstitutional.
258 F. Supp. at 490. In two early cases, Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1907),
and Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902), the United States Supreme Court held that
indeterminate sentencing statutes did not violate the federal constitution. See also
State v. Deats, 83 N.M. 154, 489 P.2d 663 (1971).
The Washington system of indeterminate sentencing does not constitute an uncon-
stitutional delegation of judicial power by the legislature. State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash.
625, 66 P.2d 360 (1937); Ex parte Behrens, 55 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wash. 1944). Addi-
tionally, the courts have held that Washington sentences may not be challenged as
cruel and unusual punishment under U.S. CONST. amend. VIII or WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 14 until the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles has determined the minimum term.
State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn. 2d 686, 171 P.2d 845 (1946); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wn.
App. 386, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975); State v. Harp, 13 Wn. App. 239, 534 P.2d 842, re-
view denied, 85 Wn. 2d 1015 (1975); State v. Floyd, I1 Wn. App. 1, 521 P.2d 1187
(1974); State v. Hurst, 5 Wn. App. 146, 486 P.2d 1136 (1971). However, in State v.
Lindsey, 187 Wash. 364, 61 P.2d 293, rev'd, 300 U.S. 397 (1937), the United States
Supreme Court held that U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, pertaining to ex post facto laws, was
623
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Some disparity in sentences might be acceptable in Washington if
the fundamental concept of indeterminate sentencing were sound, but
it is not clear that prisons do perform the task of rehabilitation.
Studies indicate that the programs individuals undertake while in
prison have no effect on their subsequent involvement in criminal
behavior. The best known study in this area is that of Robert Mar-
tinson. 29 At the request of the New York State Government Commis-
sion on Criminal Offenders, Martinson analyzed 231 studies on the
treatment of criminality. He reviewed studies, published between
1945 and 1967, that met various tests of methodological adequacy in
an attempt to determine if success in the prison context correlated
with future conduct. Martinson arrived at a number of startling con-
clusions. First, he concluded that participation in special education
programs does not affect recidivism rates. The extent of education
and the development of special skill training received in prison had no
apparent effect on recidivism. 30 Also, participation in vocational
training programs within prison did not produce fewer recidivists. 31
Even individuals who had undergone extensive individualized psy-
chotherapy returned to prison in large numbers after release. 32 Mar-
tinson concluded that "to date, education and skill development have
not lowered recidivism by rehabilitating criminals." 33 Other studies
appear to verify the results obtained by Martinson. 34
Statistics available in Washington appear to confirm these studies.
The Office of Research of the Washington Department of Social and
Health Services compiles statistics indicating the number of parolees
violated when an offender was sentenced under an indeterminate sentencing system
after having been convicted under the pre-indeterminate sentencing statutory provisions.
29. Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974).
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 25.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 28.
34. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 87 (1971). The
Friend's Service Committee, after an extensive study of prisons. concluded there is
considerable evidence that various treatment strategies do not make any significant dif-
ference in the future criminal behavior of inmates.
The Citizens Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice in New York City in 1954 pre-
pared a study measuring the results of the parole system. They found no significant
difference between the return to prison of those paroled and those who were not
paroled and served out their full terms. In one year about 10-11% of each group
went back to prison. They concluded. "Clearly. the parole board was unable to guess
who had been rehabilitated and who had not." J. Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME
172 (1975).
624
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(who presumably were rehabilitated at the time of their release) who
have subsequently returned to Washington institutions. Of all parolees
released between January 1, 1965 and December 31, 1972, 29.8%
had returned to an institution as of June 30, 1973.35 Of those released
during calendar year 1971, 22% had returned by June of 1973.36 As
the time since release increases, so does the percentage of recidivists.
Of those persons paroled in 1965, 40.6% had returned to an institu-
tion within the State of Washington by June 1973.37 Of 14,182 felons
admitted to Washington State correctional facilities from 1965 to
1973, 4,088 had previous institutional commitments.3 8
These recidivism figures demonstrate that correctional institutions
within the State of Washington have not been totally successful in
changing the behavior patterns of persons incarcerated. The figures
reflect returns to state institutions for felony convictions and may,
therefore, underestimate the total number of crimes committed by
paroled felons. Nevertheless, the figures, as well as academic studies,
point to the conclusion that prisons do not rehabilitate all criminal
offenders.
The assumptions underlying Washington's system of indeterminate
sentencing may be unrealistic. An initial difficulty is that prison be-
havior is not a satisfactory guide to subsequent behavior in the com-
munity. A parole board "purport (s] to predict the likelihood of the
prisoner's future criminality and to fix his release date partly in rela-
tion to that prediction,13 9 but prison behavior may not be a predictor
of community behavior. A prisoner's avoidance of prison disciplinary
35. Office of Research, Washington State Dep't of Social & Health Serv.. Table 1
[Total Number of Releases to Parole from Washington State Adult Corrections During
the Period Beginning January 1, 1965 and Ending December 31, 1972 by Offense and
by the Number Who Had Returned as of June 30, 1973], June, 1973 (unpublished
statistics on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review).
36. 'Id., Table 3 [Number of Releases to Parole from Washington State Adult
Corrections During Calendar Year 1971 by Offense and by Number and Percent Re-
turned to DAC Facilities], June, 1973 (unpublished statistics on file at the offices of the
Washington Law Review).
37. Id., Table 9 [Number of Releases to Parole from Washington State Adult
Corrections During Calendar Year 1965 by Offense and by Number and Percent
Returned to DAC Facilities], June, 1973 (unpublished statistics on file at the offices of
the Washington Law Review).
38. Id., ADULT CORRECTIONS DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR COUNTIES PARTICIPATING IN
ADULT PROBATION SUBSIDY vol. 8 (Research Rep. 2-1, June, 1975), at Table 37. Of the
total number of admissions, 8,735 had no prior commitments and 1,359 were "not re-
ported." Id. Presumably, the latter category may contain individuals who have had
prior commitments.
39. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 31 (1974).
625
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offenses and his involvement in prison training programs do not corre-
late with later successful completion of parole or with later avoidance
of criminal convictions.40
Other criteria may be more helpful in appraising the likelihood of
future criminality than behavior while in prison. Specifically, an of-
fender's record before coming to prison, the preservation of family
ties, the availability of a place to live, and the existence of a job may
be significant factors upon release.41 Age and maturation also appear
to result in diminished criminal involvement. 42
Additionally, a paramount objective of the prison system is to
maintain custody of those offenders who, if released, would commit
violent crimes against other persons. Unfortunately, none of our ex-
isting diagnostic techniques enable the Board or anyone else to say
who, among a certain population, will subsequently commit a violent
offense. Studies conducted on the ability to predict future violent be-
havior conclude that it may be impossible.43
B. Board Effectiveness: A Lack of Statutory Guidelines
A second serious difficulty in our system of indeterminate sen-
tencing is the theory that the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles can
properly exercise the uncontrolled discretion it has been granted. Sup-
posedly, the Board examines all aspects of the prisoner's life and be-
havior and decides if he or she is ready for release. No Board can
make profound judgments on the thousands of cases it hears each
year. A decision as to who is rehabilitated and who is not is made by
40. Id. at 35.
41. See generally D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM
(1964).
42. N. MORRIS, supra note 39, at 35-36.
43. One study found that 86% of those identified as potentially dangerous subse-
quently were not found to be involved in violent acts. N. MORRIS, supra note 39, at
34. In another study completed in 1972, Doctors Harry Kelso, Richard Boucher, and
Ralph Garofalo reported on a ten-year study of the ability to predict dangerousness
of high-risk offenders in prison in Massachusetts. They divided the population into
dangerous and non-dangerous offenders. Of 386 "safe" offenders, 31 (8%) were sub-
sequently involved in violent crimes. Of 49 "dangerous" offenders, 17 (35%) were
subsequently involved in violent crimes. Id. at 71. Although under their criteria the
doctors were able to predict with some greater degree of frequency those offenders
who would be violent, this classification system should not be utilized to determine
minimum terms and parole dates; it is still not precise enough. If a parole board had
followed the index of dangerousness as developed in the above study, 31 dangerous
offenders would have been returned to the streets and two-thirds of those classified as
dangerous would have been unfairly detained.
626
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reviewing a file of reports and interviewing the inmate for ten to fif-
teen minutes. In the final analysis, the Board is making extremely dif-
ficult and sophisticated decisions without fixed criteria.44
The legislature has never defined what constitutes "satisfactory
progress towards rehabilitation" or what factors should be considered
to determine who is or is not dangerous. Ultimately each Board
member cannot help but rely on his own intuitions and prejudices.
One member may strongly believe that white collar criminals are fre-
quently treated too leniently while another reacts strongly to sex of-
fenses. Furthermore, once a decision is made, it is not subject to re-
view.45 The Board is not even required to issue a written opinion ex-
plaining the action taken.
C. Prisoner Participation in Rehabilitation Programs: A Prerequisite
to Early Release
The third and most serious difficulty with the Washington indeter-
minate sentencing system is that it does not recognize that true re-
habilitation cannot be forced on a prisoner.46 Unless the prisoner
wants to be rehabilitated, he will not be. Yet the system forces each
prisoner to go through the motions of rehabilitation if he wants to
gain release before the term of his maximum sentence has run.47 Thus,
44. See note 10 supra and J.Q. WILSON, supra note 34, at 171-72.
45. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.040 (1974). Whereas the Board's determination
is not subject to judicial review, the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Hurst,
5 Wn. App. 146, 486 P.2d 1136 (1971), indicated that the determination of the trial
court may be subject to review if the record fails to reveal a basis for the exercise of
the court's discretion and it can be said "no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the trial court." Id. at 148, 486 P.2d at 1138. See also State v. Bresolin,
13 Wn. App. 386, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975); State v. Harris, 10 Wn. App. 509, 518 P.2d
237 (1974); State v. Birdwell, 6 Wn. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249, appeal denied, 80 Wn.
2d 1009, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 973 (1972); State v. Derefield, 5 Wn. App. 798, 491
P.2d 694 (1971); State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969).
46. Prison is frequently the last step for offenders who have experienced a life of
deprivation. Many persons committed to prison arrive with a history of crime and
sociological problems. As adults, their capabilities, personalities, values, and disorders
have developed over many years. Prison programs seek to provide them with the skills
and insight to change longstanding life patterns. But, unless the inmate sincerely seeks
to acquire the offered skills or to change his lifestyle, the programs are doomed to fail.
An offender can be forced to attend adult education classes, but he cannot be forced
to learn to read. He can be directed to attend group therapy sessions, but he cannot
be compelled to change his personality. "In psychological treatment of abnormal be-
havior it is widely agreed that conventional psychotherapy, particularly if it is of the
psychoanalytic variety, must be voluntarily entered into by the patient if it is to be
effective." N. Moims, supra note 39, at 17.
47. Coerced rehabilitation may even be an additional form of punishment: "Co-
627
Washington Law Review
rehabilitation is reduced to a game, a system in which prisoners seek
to manipulate prison officials, parole board members, and parole offi-
cers. They appear to conform to externally imposed values in order to
obtain release.48 Prisoners perceive that they must get into a program
in order to be paroled. 49 This manipulation invariably breeds a cyn-
icism which is the antithesis of the rehabilitation that the system of
indeterminate sentencing seeks to foster. The resulting effect on the
parole board is that it must decide whether an inmate's participation
in rehabilitation programs is genuine or a mere pretense to gain release.
III. WASHINGTON SENTENCING STRUCTURE: A
RECOMMENDATION
The apparent inadequacies of our present system of indeterminate
sentencing require that a careful and realistic evaluation of our pri-
sons and their treatment programs be made. The concept of incarcera-
tion should not be viewed as a rehabilitation device, but as a form of
punishment. An offender certainly does not view institutionalization
as rehabilitative; rather, he views prison as his punishment for the
crime of which he was convicted. 50 Incarceration is essentially a detri-
ment imposed on offenders out of social necessity. It does not effect a
"cure" upon offenders, although it may help deter future criminal
conduct. Therefore its duration should be based on the nature of the
ercing persons into treatment routines or imprisoning them and making their partici-
pation in rehabilitative programs a condition of their release has not, in any sense we
can measure or evaluate, made them into less criminal and more contented or more
effective individuals." AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM.. supra note 34. at 146. "'When
we punish the person and simultaneously try to treat him. we hurt the individual more
profoundly and more permanently than if we merely imprison him for a specific length
of time." Id. at 147-48.
48. The programs offered in the name of rehabilitation are an attempt to mold a
prisoner's character and values. Acceptable correctional practice is dominated by
indoctrination in dominant social values such as learning a trade, establishing proper
work habits, acquiring basic or supplemental educational skills, and participation in
religious training to the satisfaction of the Board. Offenders are thus held to a higher
standard of conduct than other citizens. Ordinarily society takes no interest in whether
or not citizens espouse generally accepted norms. If the nonoffender seeks to be un-
employed, and remain illiterate, it is not a matter for state intervention. The parolee
or probationer who does not conform with these societal norms, however, may find
his liberty taken or his incarceration prolonged.
49. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM.. supra note 34. at 88.
50. One report indicates, "As experienced by the prisoner, imprisonment with treat-
ment is identical with traditional imprisonment in most significant aspects." Id. at 25.
The report continues, "[T] he punitive spirit has survived unscathed behind the mask
of treatment." Id. at 26.
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crime committed and on prior criminal activity, not on sociological
evaluations of how long it will take to rehabilitate an offender.
Prison may serve beneficial ends if inmates voluntarily participate
in treatment programs. Although existing treatment programs in
prison should be continued, participation should not determine the
length of time a prisoner must serve. Society does not have the right to
insist upon conformity to behavior patterns deemed socially accepta-
ble, except to prevent future criminal activity.
A number of changes in the sentencing system should be made in
order to achieve these objectives. First, the legislature must define
more specifically the penalties for particular criminal conduct. It
should establish varying degrees of crimes carrying specified penalties
commensurate with the harm of the crime. For example, first degree
robbery involving the use of a deadly weapon or in which a victim is
injured might carry five to seven years; second degree robbery in-
volving the implied use of force might carry three to five years. The
Washington criminal statutes should afford less sentencing discretion
to the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, while providing greater
clarity as to the punishment for particular criminal conduct.5 1
Second, when an offender is first admitted to prison he should be
notified by the Board of a fixed release date. This date would not be
earlier than the expiration of a specific statutory minimum term, e.g.,
five years for first degree robbery, three years for second degree rob-
bery. In determining this date, the Board would work from defined
legislative guidelines, considering the facts of the crime as well as the
criminal history of the offender. Psychological data presently utilized,
such as family history, employment history, and intake diagnosis,
should not be considered in determining the term an individual spends
in prison.
Third, when each prisoner is first incarcerated, he or she should be
compelled to participate in a mandatory orientation period. During
this orientation the offender would be informed of the various educa-
51.. The changes in sentencing structure in WASH. REv. CODE tit. 9A (Supp. 1975),
see note 4 supra, do not narrow the discretion of the Board in setting minimum terms.
The legislature could have prescribed sentence limits that related to factors such as
the age of the offender, the nature of the crime committed, and the offender's record
of prior conviftions and incarceration, thereby limiting the Board's discretion. See
Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awry-A Proposal for Fundamental Change in Crim-
inal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REv. 529 (1976). Now that the legislature has re-eval-
uated sentencing on a crime-by-crime basis in Title 9A, it should also consider the
effectiveness of the prevailing sentencing policy in Washington.
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tional, religious, and psychological programs available within the
prison. At both the beginning and the end of the orientation, offenders
should be told that participation in any of these programs is voluntary
and will not affect release.
Fourth, once the date for release has been set, it should not be re-
duced by the offender's behavior within the institution. The Board
should, however, have the option of increasing the inmate's term up to
the court-imposed maximum for infractions of prison rules. This
would aid prison officials in maintaining control and would assure
that each person serves no less than the legislatively determined min-
imum term for his or her particular offense.
Finally, a prisoner's return to the community should be gradual.
The prisoner's ability to return to society should be tested by lim-
ited periods of release during the prison term. Through the utilization
of work-release programs, halfway houses, or furloughs, these periods
of freedom could increase gradually, thus easing the prisoner's transi-
tion back to the outside community.
These recommendations are designed to assist in the process of re-
defining the purposes and objectives of prisons. The punishment of
imprisonment is a warranted social response to certain types of crim-
inal conduct, but offenders should be punished for the crimes they
committed, not for indefinite sociological and psychological factors in
their backgrounds such as family life or ability to conform to societal
norms.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles has broad discretionary
powers to release most convicted felons whenever it determines that
such persons have been rehabilitated and are fit to return to society.
Unfortunately, this system has led to many prisoners' outward partici-
pation in rehabilitation programs without their mental commitment
to it. The result has been that unrehabilitated prisoners are released
from prison long before the expiration of their maximum sentences. It
has been suggested herein that a more determinate method of sentenc-
ing, along with voluntary participation in rehabilitation, is preferable
as it would not only lead to similar offenders being treated similarly,
but would result in more adequate rehabilitation for those who wished
to participate in such rehabilitation programs.
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